

Computer Networks & Software Inc.

Accelerating CNS

Security Considerations for the Future e-Enabled Aircraft

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e = IP

ICNS Aerospace May 22, 2003

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- Introduction
- Review of threats and impacts
- Review of available security mechanisms for Internet applications
- Review of available security mechanisms for Aeronautical Telecommunications Network(ATN) Applications
- Conclusions

Derived from the work activities related to NASA GRC funded support of the AEEC Aircraft Data Network Standard 664


- Contemporary trends background and the need for a defining a system engineering approach
- A security system engineering methodology
 - Report on the ongoing work of AEEC 664
- Status security related activities since 9/11
 - ICAO ATN
 - AEEC
 - RTCA
- Remarks on aviation industry PKI




Why Security? CNS Data Link Threats

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
Privacy




Denial of Service




Authentication



Data Corruption



Integrity





Framework for Interoperability

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AC	CARS	S ATN	OSI MODEL	ТСР	/IPv4	ТСР	/IPv6
CPD ADS,		CPDLC, ADS, FIS	Application	FTP Telnet	NFS	FTP Telnet	NFS
		СОРР	Presentation	SMTP	XDR	SMTP	XDR
		COSP	Session	SNMP	RPC	SNMP	RPC
ACA	ARS	TP4, CLTP	Transport	TCP, UDP		TCP, UDP	
	CLNP Routing Protocols SNDCF		Network	IPv4 Routing Protocols ICMP		IPv6 Routing Protocols ICMPv6	
AEEC Specified Subnetwork		VDL Mode 2, 3, 4	Link	Industry	Specified	Industry	Specified
		Mode S SATCOM	Physical	Industry Specified Subnetwork		Industry Specified Subnetwork	


Aeronautical Protocols

Industry Standard Protocols



Easy monitor ACARS Datalink Messages

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What's Disclosed?

- Graphical Position Reports
- Contact Reports
- Detailed Message Logs

Denial of Service

Easily jammed

A Personal Computer RF Scanner and Readily Available Freeware are all that is Needed

Courtesy James McMath, Titan Corporation



Military ACARS Internet Monitoring Site

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Bart's ACARS and Beaver pages - Microsoft Internet Explorer Eile Edit View Favorites Tools Help							. <u> 5 × </u>
← Back → → ✓ ② ② △ △ Q Search → Favorites → Media	ACARS	Reg.	Flightnr	Type	Unit	Homebase	last noted
Address at http://www.homepages.hetnet.nl/~hoekb03/military.html							
<u>Home</u> M	\$70400	97-0400	G\$0001	C-37A	89 AW	Andrews AFB	02-08-2001
ACARS Links	\$70401	97-0401	G\$0001	C-37A	89 AW	Andrews AFB	23-09-2002
Military ACARS at	02-0201	02-0201		C-40C			-
<u>pacais</u> Ot	02-0202	02-0202	MC####	C-40C			
Beaver Museum Beaver Tribute	02-0203	02-0203		C-40C			
<u>Misc. Links</u>	02-0204	02-0204		C-40C			
	90402	99-0402	GS0001	C-37A	76 AS SHAPE	Chievres (Belgium)	24-11-2002
	90404	99-0404	G\$0001	C-37A			14-04-2002
	90405	99-0405	G\$0001	C-37A			
	98-0001	98-0001	-	C-32A	89 AW	Andrews AFB	
Ra	98-0002	98-0002	MC0091	C-32A	89 AW	Andrews AFB	13-07-1998
Re	99-0003	99-0003	-	C-32A	89 AW	Andrews AFB	
0	99-0004	99_0004	•	C-32A	87 AW	CHANGE AFB	
	•	82-8000	-	VC-25A	89 AW	Andrews AFB	2002
	-	92-9000	-	VC-25A	89 AW	Andrews AFB	26-0 -2002
me flig	10020	01-0028	G\$0001	C-37A	6 AW / 310 AS	McDIII AFB	08-03-2001
Во	10029	01-0029	G\$0001	C-37A	6 AW / 310 AS	McDIII AFB	25-09-2002
Re	10030	01-0030	G\$0001	C-37A	6 AW / 310 AS	McDIII AFB	11-10-2002
0	10065	01-0065	G\$0001	C-37A			
₩ 6	10076	01-0076	G\$0001	C-37A	6 AW / 310 AS	McDill AFB	27-11-2002
		00-0015		C-40B	Boeing		

Courtesy James McMath, Titan Corporation





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Not just a data link issue - security is not an add-on.

- Technical
 - Functionality, Architecture, and Design
- Organizational
 - Definition, Separation, "Need to Know"
- Procedural
 - Identification, Authentication, Limitation, Observation

Security must be built into the system or integrated systems design.

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E(IP)-Enabled Aircraft - Motivation

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
- Business process integration and more automation
- Driven by passengers
- Use of mass market "open system" products
- Lower development and operational costs
- Safety
- Examples: A380, Eurocontrol ATM ground networks (iPAX), NASA Small Aircraft Transportation – Airborne Internet

Onboard and offboard applications integrated through IP-based networks



NASA Distributed Air-Ground Concepts (DAG-TM)

- Benefits in collaboration and integrated systems outweighs the separate and vertical systems of today
- **■** Three Constituents
 - Airline Dispatch (AOC)
 - Air Traffic Management
 - Flight Deck
- Interconnectivity is key to business success






DAG-TM Constituent: Flight Deck

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All Parts of the AIRCRAFT will have a voice in air commerce collaboration*




representative -- not at all intended to be an

exhaustive list.

¹¹



Transition DAG-TM Constituents








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■ Each constituent has multiple internal and external direct connections with the others and with the world — creating the air commerce web.





Reference Model – Domains





Before Designing - We Need Industry Consensus

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- What is our obligation about security?
- What is our investment in security?
- How do we protect that investment?
- What is the right design?

Need an industry policy covering not just ATC or just the data link, but one covering all domains.

Until then, we will do our best in ADN 664 Part 5

Develop the Policy



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
- Analyze the Required/Desired Capabilities
 - Cockpit, Cabin, Maintenance, Ground Crews
- Define Acceptable Operational Limits
 - Permissible Behavior in Failure or Attack Conditions
- Establish Integrated Security Policies
 - Policies Must Comprise All Operational Areas

Normally this means undertaking a system engineering approach to problem solving



Information Security Discussion

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The need is to develop the solution set through a system engineering approach



Reference Domains - Top Level

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Onboard


- Communications Network Interconnect (AEEC 763)
- Crew (Crew Information System)(AEEC 763/628)
- Passenger/In-flight Entertain (IFE) (AEEC 628)
- Avionics (multiple) (AEEC 664)
- Offboard
 - IP-Based Internet/VPN
 - Non-IP Aeronautical
- Must look at the security from the context of all domains and cross domains both onboard and offboard.
- Must look at the dataflows between trusted areas.

CNS

Typical Methodology

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Consider all Domains



CNS

Threat Definitions

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Types of Threats

- Impact on life
- Impact upon property
- Impact on opportunity

Impact of Successful Threat Action

- Grave loss of life or injury
- Critical injury and serious damage to property
- Some damage to present or future resources
- Annoyance minimal loss of time, induces stress
- Little minor disruption
- Unknown
- None

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Example Attack Methods

- Pre-production compromise (built-in back doors)
- Substitution of parts (Trojans in software)
- Code attacks (viruses)
- Network attacks (worms)
- Denial of Service attacks
- System specific attacks (OS vulnerability)
- Authentication bypass (theft of credentials, spoofing)
- Shutdown of support systems (power, AC, flight controls etc.)
- Disgruntled employee (malicious or paid)
- Content exploitation (information made public, identity of crew/passengers, aircraft incidents or failures)



Threat Impacts

	Success of Threat A	ction results in:		
Domain/Interface	Human User	Application	Network	End System
	Disruption or	Disruption or	Disruption or	Disruption or
	Denial	Failure	Failure	Failure
Onboard				
Comm Network Interconnect (CNI)	Up to critical	Some	Critical	Critical
Crew (non-pilot)	Some	Some	Critical	Critical
Passenger/ In-Flight Entertainment (IFE)	Annoyance	Annoyance	Revenue Related (Some)	Future Revenue (Some)
Avionics	Grave	Grave	Grave	Grave
Offboard				
IP-Based, Aeronautical (non-ATC) and	Critical	Some	Critical	Critical
Internet	Annoyance	Annoyance	Annoyance	Annoyance
Aeronautical Non IP-Based	Grave	Critical	Critical	Critical
Interfaces (cross-domain)				
IP Ground Network (GN) to CNI	Up to critical	Up to critical	Up to critical	Up to critical
Non-IP Aeronautical Ground to Avionics	Up to grave	Up to grave	Up to grave	Up to grave
IP GN Internet to Passenger/IFE	Some	Some	Some	Some
CNI to Avionics	Grave	Grave	Grave	Grave
CNI to Crew	Critical	Some	Some	Some
CNI to Passengers/IFE	Some	Some	Some	Some
Passenger/IFE to Avionics	Annoyance	Annoyance	Annoyance	Annoyance
Crew to Avionics	Critical	Some	Some	Some



Network Security Services/Functions

- F1: Authentication
- F2: Access
- F3: Data Confidentiality
- F4: Data Integrity
- F5: Non-Repudiation
- **F6:** Intrusion Protection Methods
- **F7: Counter Measures**
- **F8: Recovery of System/Operation**
- F9: Logging



Network Security Sub-functions

- **F1: Authentication**
 - F1.1: Validity Checking
 - F1.2: Protection of Stored Validity Data
 - F1.3: Confidentiality of Data in Transit
 - F1.4: Additional Security Measures
- F2: Access
 - F2.1: Access Control
 - F2.2: Access List Administration
- **F3:** Data Confidentiality
 - F3.1: Encryption
 - F3.2: Key Distribution and Management
 - F3.3: Level of Security
 - F3.4: Layer of Encryption (Physical, Network, Higher)
 - F3.5: Encryption Application Program Interface (API)



Security Sub-functions (cont..)

- F4: Data Integrity
 - F4.1: Acceptable transmission error
 - F4.2: Anti-Spoofing/Message Digests
 - F4.3: Key Distribution and Management
- F5: Non-Repudiation
 - F5.1: Confirmation
 - F5.2: Retention of Confirmation
 - F5.3: Key Distribution and Management
- **F6: Intrusion Protection Methods**
 - F6.1: Bastion Host
 - F6.2: Filters
 - F6.3: Application Gateway (Proxy Server)
 - F6.4: Internal Domain Name Server (DNS)



Security Sub-functions (cont..)

- **F7: Counter Measures**
 - F7.1 Protection
 - » Denial of service, code (virus), network (worms), Trojan software
 - F7.2 Detection
 - F7.3 Response
- **F8:** Recovery of System/Operation
- F9: Logging




Assessment Matrix Example (Key Dataflows)

				<u> </u>		
Security Function/	Aero IP GN	Internet	CNI to	CNI to	CNI to Avionics	Aero Non IP GN
Sub-function	To CNI	To IP GN	Passengers/IFE	Crew.		To Avionics
		To CNI				
1: Authentication						
1.1: Validity Checking	Offboard	Offboard	Yes + Billing	Yes	Yes, Might be	Offboard
			_		static	
1.2: Protection of	Yes	User Defined	User defined	Yes	Yes	Yes
Stored Data						
1.3: Confidentiality of	Yes	User defined	User defined	Yes	Yes (AG Appls)	Yes
data in transmit						
1.4: Additional	Maybe	No	No	No	Maybe	Maybe
Security Measures						
2: Access Control						
2.1: Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2.1: Access List Admin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3: Data Confidentiality						
3.1: Encryption	Yes	User Defined	User defined	Yes	Yes	Yes
3.2: Key Distribution	Yes	User defined	User defined	Yes	Yes	Yes
and Management						
3.3: Level of Security	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
3.4: Layer of						
encryption						
3.4.1: Physical	No	No	No	No	No	No
3.4.2: Network	Yes	User defined	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
3.4.3: Higher Layers	No	User defined	User defined	No	No	Yes
3.5: Encryption API	No	No	No	No	No	No



Internetworking Architecture Analysis





Building Block Reference Model


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- View each domain as a set of Network Functional Elements (NFEs).
- Analyze the dataflows between domains.
- Specify the requirements for the services performed by each NFE in the dataflow between trusted areas.
- Understand the operational impacts and costs.

Reads similar to the "COMMON Criteria" approach



Building Block Reference Model





Network Security Functional Elements

	Authentication	Access	Data Confidentiality	Data Integrity	Non-Repudiation	Intrusion Protection Methods	Counter Measures	Recovery of System / Operation	Logging
End System (or DTE)	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Autoconfigure / Loader	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Certification Authority	•	-	•	•	•	1	1	-	•
DHCP	-	-	-	•	-	-	-	-	0
DNS	0	-	-	•	-	•	-	-	0
Network Management Station	•	•	•	•	•	-	-	-	•
Firewall	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	•
Gateway	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	0
Router	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	0
Access Point	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	-	-
Bridge (or Switch)	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	-	•
Backbone	0	0	•	•	•	•	-	-	-
Cable Plant	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	-	-
Repeater (or Hub)	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	-	-

Legend	Meaning
-	Not Applicable
0	Optional
•	Present, but not required for a special task
•	Present, required for a special task



Security Sub-functions – Authentication

F1: Authentication	F1.1: Validity Checking	F1.2: Protection of Stored Validation Data	F1.3: Confidentiality of Data in Transit	F1.4: Additional Security Measures
End System (or DTE)	•	•	•	0
Certification Authority	•	•	•	0
Network Management Station	•	•	•	0
Firewall	-	-	•	_

Legend	Meaning
_	Not Applicable
0	Optional
•	Present, but not required for a special task
•	Present, required for a special task



Security Sub-functions – e.g., Authentication

F1: Authentication	F1.1: Validity Checking	F1.2: Protection of Stored Validation Data	F1.3: Confidentiality of Data in Transit	F1.4: Additional Security Measures
End System (or DTE)	Shall require valid UserID/Password combination to access Network services.	May store passwords locally; if so, these passwords shall be stored in an encrypted format.	Shall encrypt sensitive information (e.g. passwords) before transmitting through the network.	May employ additional security measures (e.g. smart cards, single-use passwords).
Certification Authority	Shall validate credentials before performing services for a user.	May store passwords and private keys locally; if so, these shall be stored in an encrypted format.	Shall encrypt sensitive information (e.g. passwords, private keys) before transmitting through the network.	May employ additional security measures (e.g. smart cards, single use passwords).
Network Management Station	Shall require valid UserID/Password combination to access the system.	May store passwords locally; if so, these shall be stored in an encrypted format.	Shall encrypt sensitive information (e.g. passwords) before transmitting through the network.	May employ additional security measures (e.g. smart cards, single use passwords).
Firewall	-	-	Shall apply filters to prevent sensitive data from crossing into publicly accessible domains.	-

Next Steps



- Break down the End-to-End communications process by potential information flow and describe what services are required for each flow.
- Potential endpoints to consider include IP and Non-IP Ground systems, the Avionics and Pilot, the Crew, and the Passengers
 - Ground IP → Avionics
 - » AOC, Weather
 - Ground Non-IP → Avionics
 - Avionics → Crew
 - Ground IP → Crew
 - Ground IP → Passenger
- SEEK ANALYSIS FUNDING SOURCES

Standaras and Recommended Practices (SARPs)



- Document 9705, Ed 3, October 2002 Sub-Volume VIII
- Risk analysis performed by Eurocontrol has identified the following threats:
 - Masquerade/modification/replay of air-ground application communications.
 - Denial of service by flooding ground IDRP databases.
- **ATN SARPs (Edition 3) provides the following security services:**
 - Authentication and integrity of air-ground applications.
- Authentication and integrity of IDRP communications.
 - Supporting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
- Airlines desire to ensure the confidentiality of operational data.
- ATNP WG-B/Sub-Group 3 is enhancing the ATN SARPs to add confidentiality services (ed. 4)

- Several Presentations by interested agencies
 - Many agencies looking at security
 - Meeting attendees agreed now's the time to look at standards development
- Opportunities exist for either Data Link Service Provider (DSP) or End Agency User solutions
 - Based on user requirements and cost benefits
- ATN security is the baseline ACARS security should be compatible with/conform to ATN security requirements.
 - Bottom Line don't build an ACARS only solution!



Ad Hoc Meeting Conclusions

- Meeting report published on ARINC Website
 - http://www.arinc.com/aeec/projects/dlk_systems/security /index.html
- Consensus reached on report conclusions
 - Data Link Security is a Concern
 - At Least One Potential Solution for ACARS and ATN in Development
 - Problem with distribution of Threat and Vulnerability
 Information AEEC Charter is Open Information
 - AEEC Must Coordinate with Other Organizations
 - Early Considerations will Minimize Future Costs





- Requested that Service Providers and Avionics Vendors get together to find legacy system approach (closed sessions)
- ARINC Standards/Project Improvement Modification (APIM) 02-002. Responds to ATN Panel Letter
 - Requests AEEC Investigate Key Management and Distribution
 - Develop AEEC Standard
- Accepted by AEEC General Session (2002)
 - Assigned Category 1 Priority (Authorized)
 - Assigned to:
 - » Data Link Users Forum
 - » Data Link System Subcommittee

RTCA SC-201



- Chartered in Sept 2002
- The FAA position is that ACARS operational approval now includes messages which directly impact safety and regularity of flight (i.e., AOC data link ACARS does not meet published FAR means of compliance for hardware and software which support these AOC messages) in other words ACARS is operating above is design assurance level
- Weight and Balance messages contain:
 - Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW)
 - Gross Take Off Weight (GTOW)
 - GTOW Center of Gravity (C.G.)
- Takeoff Data in messages contain:
 - V-Speeds: V1 / VR / V2
 - Flap setting
- **Committee Main Focus in software assurance level**
 - Other data link data not in focus



The Approach Summary ADN Part 5

- Need to develop a clear threat assessment.
- Need to develop Aviation Industry (may be the AEEC) Security Policy that is applicable to all domains or wait for the HLS to organize it?
- Develop specific security design
 - Separate security domains onboard
 - Relative levels of security per domain
 - Functional limitation between domains
 - Definitive operational predetermination
 - Define procedural and administrative rules
- Awaiting ADN Committee direction
- Key to the statement of requirement is the understanding of the security design/features available in today's protocols



Security Services ATN and IP

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- Key Management
- Confidentiality
- Non repudiation
- Integrity/Authentication
- Authorization

Key Issue:

Where (protocol layer) to provide these services



ATN Security Services

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Goal:

- Secure exchange of ATS information
- Protection against unauthorized access

ATN Security Services:

- Access Control
- Authentication
- Data Integrity



ATN Security Services (cont....)

- Message Authentication
 - 64 bit key between peer entities
 - Message Authentication Check (MAC) in each message
- Replay Protection
 - Unique Message ID or Sequence number for the life time of key
- Security Label
 - Specified by the transport service user to be associated with TSDU
- IDRP
 - Type 1, 2 or 3 mechanisms
 - Type 1 is based on unencrypted checksum
- ATN Security Frame work PKI



TCP/IP Security Services

- IP Security (IPSec)
 - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
 - Authentication Header (AH)
- Authentication Header (AH) functions
 - Proof of data origin, Data Integrity, Anti Replay protection
- Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) functions
 - AH functions + data confidentiality
- Transport Mode
 - Upper layer protocols
- Tunnel Mode
 - IP Datagrams
 - Our thesis is security at the IP layer has many advantages




Challenges in Specifying the Requirements

- Getting ready for aviation applications use of or move towards an accepted aviation architecture fully based upon IP
- Application layer versus other layer security
- Final specification of PKI
 - Individual States determine own ATN Security Requirements
 - » Standardization is a must do activity.
 - » Avoid Regional/individual State implementations.
 - Key Pairs must change every 28 days
 - » Same cycle as Navigation Data Base uploads.
 - » Private Keys must be protected.
 - » Public Keys must be distributed according to owning CA prerogatives.
 - Airframe has only 2 key pairs for all ATN applications



PKI in a Secure CPDLC Environment







- In a public-key cryptographic scheme, each user has two keys known as a key pair. One key is public, the other is private.
- The mathematical relationship between the keys ensures knowledge of public key does not compromise private key.
- Public-key encryption schemes provide data confidentiality. Public key signature schemes provide data integrity, data origin authentication, and nonrepudiation.




Certification Issues

- Two types of cryptographic scheme are in use: symmetric schemes and public key schemes.
- Certification can solve the public key distribution problem. CAs can be off-line and are not unconditionally trusted.
- However CAs do take on significant liability, they have high security requirements, and they need a supporting infrastructure - a Public Key.
- Infrastructure or PKI. Furthermore, issues need to be addressed:
 - Multiple CAs.
 - Revocation.
 - Certificate size (X.509 cert size often 20K).



Example of Certificate Environment







- Interoperability -
 - Mature API is not yet there
- Scalability
 - At present all implementations are small scale.
 Scalability is question
- Affordability
 - positively identifying internal and external users, generating keys, issuing them digital certificates, and managing the exchange and verification of certificates. In addition, existing software applications, electronic directories, and other legacy systems must be modified so they can interact with the PKI.





- Policies and Procedures
 - Establishing and enforcing policies and procedures will require resolution of a range of sensitive issues.
- Trained personnel
 - Operator and technical staffs





- End User Experience
- Impact of Network Performance
- Server Performance
- CA Performance Issues
 - Right sizing CPU
 - Database organization(indexing..)
 - Right sizing Memory
 - Excessive client to server communication



Adopt the World of Mobile IP

- Use the framework of IPv6
- Work the AAA
- Lead aviation requirements into IETF NEtwork MObility (NEMO) Working Group



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